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I.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
This is a medical negligence case wherein Debra Dlouhy, Dustin Dlouhy, individually

and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Duane Dlouhy, Drue Hartfield, and Demi Dlouhy
(hereinafter referred to as "Appellants") claim Respondent Kootenai Hospital District, dba
Kootenai Health, and Kootenai Clinic, LLC (hereinafter collectively referred to as
"Respondents") vicariously through its employees, Michael James, M.D. ("Dr. James"), PA
James McMahon ("PA McMahon"), and N.P. Susan E. Hildebrandt ("NP Hildebrandt"),
provided gastroenterology medical care below the standard of care to the deceased, Duane
Dlouhy, allegedly causing a delayed diagnosis of colorectal cancer and death. This appeal arises
out of the district court's summary judgment dismissal of Appellants' medical negligence case
following a finding that Appellants failed to produce a qualified expert with actual knowledge of
the applicable standard of health care in the community as required under Idaho Code§§ 6-1012
and 6-1013.

B.

Course of Proceedings
On May 23, 2017, the Appellants filed a Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial alleging

medical malpractice against Kootenai Clinic, LLC; Susan E. Hildebrant, N.P.; James P.
McMahon, PA-C; and unnamed general business entities. (R. pp. 12-23). This Complaint was
later amended adding the following named defendants: Kootenai Hospital District d/b/a Kootenai
Health; Jeffrey M. Zurosky, M.D.; Henry G. Amon, M.D.; Robert C. Seeley, M.D.; Western
Medical Associates, PLLC; and Nicole S. Burbank, M.D. (R. pp. 24-37).
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On January 22, 2018, upon stipulation by the parties, the Appellants filed a Second

Amended Complaint for Wrongful Death and Demand for Jury Trial, removing Susan E.
Hildebrant, N.P. and James P. McMahon, PA-C as named defendants. (R. pp. 59-72). This was
shortly followed by summary judgment proceedings brought by Kootenai Health, which resulted
in the district court ordering that the claims against Kootenai Health for vicariously liability for
any act or omission of non-employees Defendants Jeffrey M. Zurosky, M.D.; Henry G. Amon,
M.D.; Robert C. Seeley, M.D.; Western Medical Associates, PLLC; and Nicole S. Burbank,
M.D., related to the lawsuit, be dismissed. (R. pp. 175-177). A stipulation between the parties
was further entered on July 23, 2018, dismissing the final independent defendant, Nicole S.
Burbank, M.D .-leaving the Kootenai Health entities as the sole defendants in this action. (R. pp
180-187).
Appellants served Plaintiffs' Disclosure of Expert Witnesses on February 11, 2019,
identifying two medical professionals, Kenneth J. Hammerman, M.D. ("Dr. Hammerman") and
Judy L. Schmidt, M.D., FACP ("Dr. Schmidt") to testify that the care provided by Dr. James, PA
McMahon, and NP Hildebrant fell below the applicable standard of care. (R. pp. 231-308). Dr.
Hammerman was deposed on March 12, 2019, and Dr. Schmidt's deposition was scheduled for
April 22, 2019. 1 (R. pp. 342-366).
On March 20, 2019, Kootenai Health brought its Motion for Summary Judgment on the
grounds that Appellants failed to meet an essential element of their case by failing to disclose a
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Due to scheduling issues, Dr. Schmidt's deposition occurred after the Motion for Summary
Judgment was heard. The Motion for Summary Judgment was filed at that time to comply with
the deadline for summary judgment motions in the district court's Pretrial Order.
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qualified expert with actual knowledge of the applicable standard of health care practice in the
community alleged to have been breached by Kootenai Health or its employees. (R. pp. 198217). This Motion was supported by a Memorandum, Affidavit, and a Statement of Undisputed
Facts. (R. pp. 198-411). Appellants filed their opposition on April 3, 2019, and oral argument
was held on April 17, 2019. (R. pp. 425-247; Tr. pp. 3-45). Based on the issues addressed at oral
argument, the parties stipulated to dismiss all direct liability claims against Kootenai Health and
Kootenai Clinic, LLC, limiting liability strictly to vicarious liability for the acts or omission of
its employees Dr. James, PA McMahon, and RN Hildebrant, and an order granting said
stipulation was issued on May 17, 2019. (R. pp. 752-756).
Thereafter, the district court issued its Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendant

Kootenai Hospital District's Motion for Summary Judgment on June 3, 2019, granting Kootenai
Health's motion because Appellants did not establish a prima facie claim for medical malpractice
under Idaho Code §§ 6-1012 and 6-1013. (R. pp. 757-785). A Judgment for Dismissal with

Prejudice was entered on June 5, 2019, and an Amended Judgment awarding costs was entered
on August 2, 2019. (R. pp. 786-787; 828-829). This appeal timely followed.

C.

Statement of Facts
1.

Mr. Duane Dlouhy 's Relevant Medical Care

Mr. Dlouhy was seen at Kootenai Health's Emergency Department on May 24, 2015, by
Dr. Seeley who performed a rectal exam that revealed "no obvious mass" and the presence of
dark red blood on exam. (R. p. 484). Dr. Seeley charted, "I have discussed the findings with the
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patient and his wife. This could be secondary to internal hemorrhoid bleeding. It could also be
secondary to diverticular bleeding or mass." (R. p. 484).
Mr. Dlouhy returned to the Emergency Department by private car on May 25, 2015, at
2:08 a.m. (R. p. 486). He was seen by Jeffrey Zurosky, M.D., who charted "[h]e did have a CT
scan done earlier today that did reveal some thickening of the lateral aspect of the rectum which
may be secondary to underlying infection and inflammation. The patient did have the findings
discussed with him." (R. p. 489).
Later, on May 25, 2015, at 6:52 a.m., Dr. Scott Loss evaluated Mr. Dlouhy. (R. p. 491).
Dr. Loss personally reviewed the CT report from the previous evening and noted it showed
"focal wall thickening left lateral aspect of the rectum possibly secondary to underlying
infection/inflammation.

Neoplasm

not

excluded.

Colonic

diverticulosis

no

evidence

diverticulitis." (R. p. 494). Dr. Loss went on to chart, "GI bleed order set involved rectal lesion
based on CT as noted. I discussed with the patient and his wife implications of this finding." (R.
p. 495).

Dr. Michael James, a Kootenai Health gastroenterologist, consulted with the Dlouhy's
regarding the findings. (R. p. 497). Dr. James specifically noted the findings of the CT scan
from the previous evening and that they were somewhat concerning, and he would proceed with
a colonoscopy after discussing the risks, benefits, and alternatives with Mr. Dlouhy. Id.
Dr. James conducted a colonoscopy on Mr. Dlouhy at 8:00 a.m. on May 25, 2015. Dr.
James noted "fair" prep and some visibility issues with a large amount of blood and clot in the
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mid ascending colon and diverticula throughout the descending colon. (R. p. 500). Dr. James
suspected a possible diverticular bleed. Id.
Mr. Dlouhy was discharged from the hospital and followed up with his primary care
doctor on June 16, 2015, who noted that Mr. Dlouhy has a follow up with gastroenterology
booked June 30, 2015. (R. p. 507).
Mr. Dlouhy kept his June 30, 2015 follow-up appointment with Kootenai Health
Gastroenterology and saw PA McMahon. PA McMahon ordered Mr. Dlouhy's old colonoscopy
records from a different facility and told Mr. Dlouhy to come back if he had further symptoms.
(R. pp. 510-512).
Mr. Dlouhy came back to see PA McMahon on September 1, 2015, because Mr. Dlouhy
noticed blood in his stool. (R. p. 514). PA McMahon noted that the previous colonoscopy from
May of 2015 had poor preparation, and he ordered a follow-up colonoscopy. (R. p. 515). PA
McMahon issued an order for the bowel preparation for the ordered colonoscopy. Id.
On January 15, 2016, Mr. Dlouhy saw his primary care provider with complaints of rectal
pain and bleeding. (R. p. 517). Dr. Lindblad noted that despite these symptoms, Mr. Dlouhy had
not followed up with gastroenterology since September 1, 2015, or schedule the ordered
colonoscopy. (R. p. 517). Dr. Lindblad charted that Mr. Dlouhy needed to go back to Dr. James
for the follow-up colonoscopy. (R. pp. 520- 521).
On January 26, 2016, Mr. Dlouhy and his wife saw NP Hildebrandt for rectal pain,
bleeding, and diarrhea. (R. p. 525). Mr. Dlouhy complained of rectal pain since at least
December, and maybe as long as last May. Id. NP Hildebrandt performed a rectal exam and
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noted internal hemorrhoids present on the right anterior, but no masses were present. (R. p. 526).
NP Hildebrandt noted her discussion with the Dlouhys that he did not have great prep in his May
25, 2015, colonoscopy, and suggested a repeat colonoscopy. (R. p. 527). In fact, NP Hildebrandt
ordered the repeat coloscopy so Mr. Dlouhy could simply schedule it. (R. pp. 559-560;

Hildebrant Depo., p. 76, 11. 5-8, p. 77, 11. 2-8). NP Hildebrandt charted that Mr. Dlouhy was
reluctant to get a colonoscopy at that time and wanted to try more conservative treatment first.
(R. p. 527). Mr. Dlouhy and his wife ultimately agreed with NP Hildebrant that he would follow
up in two weeks, and if he had no improvement, he would undergo a colonoscopy for further
evaluation. (R. p. 527).
Instead of undergoing the recommended and ordered colonoscopy, Mr. Dlouhy saw a
naturopathic provider and underwent coffee enemas. (R. p. 350; Hammerman Depo. p. 30, 11. 1622). Mr. Dlouhy did not obtain a follow-up colonoscopy until August 3, 2016, at which time he
was diagnosed with stage IV colorectal cancer. (R. p. 350; Hammerman Depo. p. 31. 11. 3-6).

2.

Plaintiffs' Expert Witness Disclosures

On February 11, 2019, Appellants served Plaintiffs' Disclosure of Expert Witnesses,
identifying two medical professionals, Dr. Hammerman and Dr. Schmidt. Neither listed expert
has ever practiced medicine in Kootenai County or the State of Idaho, and neither expert has
discussed or conferred with a local practitioner regarding the community standard of care or facts
of this case. (R. pp. 220-225; 231-340).
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a.

Plaintiffs' Expert Witness Dr. Judy Schmidt, MD., FACP is not Qualified
to Testify Under Idaho Law.

Dr. Schmidt is an oncologist, internist, and hematologist who was licensed to practice
medicine in Montana from 1988 until 2010 and has been licensed in Hawaii since 2010. (R. pp.
24 7-249; 266-267). Dr. Schmidt has never practiced or been licensed in the State of Idaho, nor
has she ever practiced as a gastroenterologist. (R. pp. 221-222; 289-292). Dr. Schmidt's expert
opinions in this case are limited to those provided in Plaintiffs' Expert Disclosures and her
corresponding report dated February 9, 2019. (R. pp. 247-249; 266-288). Appellants never
supplemented these disclosures with any testimony by Dr. Schmidt by affidavit or deposition.
In her report at page five, Dr. Schmidt indicated she reviewed certain medical records and
depositions from this case and listed them as the basis for her opinions. (R. p. 270). Plaintiffs'
Expert Disclosures provide, "Dr. Schmidt will testify that she reviewed the medical records of
Duane Dlouhy for May 2015, and all other items listed in paragraph 4 [and] ... Dr. Schimdt will
utilize her experience training, expertise, and review of the materials as outlined in paragraphs 2
and 4 to provide the bases and reasons for his [sic] opinions." (R. p. 24 7).
Dr. Schmidt did not articulate a basis for her bullet-point conclusory opinions listed as
"Breach of Standard of Care" much less in relation to the relevant standard of care in this case,
namely the standard of care for gastroenterology care in Coeur d'Alene, Idaho during the years of
2015 and 2016. (R. pp. 286-287). Dr. Schmidt did not discuss the standard of care with any local
practitioner, nor did she speak with or confer with anyone about this matter except
communications with Appellants' counsel. (R. pp. 24 7-249; 266-288). In fact, nowhere in
Plaintiffs' Expert Disclosures of Dr. Schmidt does it state the basis for Dr. Schmidt's familiarity
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with the community standard for a gastroenterologist, nurse practitioner, or physician's assistant.

Id. Dr. Schmidt's basis for her opinions was not supplemented by the Appellants by affidavit or
otherwise.

b.

Plaintiffs' Expert Witness Dr. Kenneth Hammerman is not Qualified to
Testify Under Idaho Law.

Dr. Hammerman is a board-certified gastroenterologist who practices in San Francisco,
California. (R. pp. 258-264). Dr. Hammerman testified at deposition that he has never practiced
in the State of Idaho and has never spoken to anyone who has practiced medicine in the State of
Idaho or Kootenai County. (R. p. 344; Hammerman Depo. p. 7, 11. 3-15). Dr. Hammerman
further testified that he has never worked with a nurse practitioner or a physician's assistant. (R.
p. 347; Hammerman Depo. p. 18, 11. 11-20). Dr. Hammerman's expert witness disclosure failed
to articulate a specific basis for his opinions as to the local standard of care; instead, it provides
multiple broad, contravening assertions of familiarity and theories as to why a local standard of
care does not exist. (R. pp. 231-247; 258-264).
With respect to the familiarity with the local standard of care of a gastroenterologist in
Coeur d'Alene in 2015 and 2016, Plaintiffs' Expert Witness Disclosures state, "Dr. Hammerman
has actual knowledge of the standard of care based on the deposition of Dr. James." (R. p. 235).
It further states, "As a board-certified physician, specially trained in gastroenterology, Dr. James
is bound to the national standard of care ... " [and] "Dr. Hammerman will testify that he is
familiar with this standard of care based on his medical training and experience outlined in his
CV; his management of patients in clinical settings; and his review of the documents listed in
paragraph 5." (R. pp. 240-244).
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Dr. Hammerman asserts familiarity with the local standard of care for nurse practitioners
and physician's assistants, " ... based on his medical training and experience outlined in his CV;
his treatment and management of patients in clinical settings; and his review of the documents
listed in paragraph 5." Id. Dr. Hammerman asserts familiarity with the scope of practice of
physician's assistants and nurse practitioners despite never using them in his practice. (R. p. 34 7;
Hammerman Depa. p. 18, 11. 11-20).

Paragraph 5 of Plaintiffs' Expert Witness Disclosures does not provide a list of
documents utilized but rather states, "Everything listed or referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 as
well as any Exhibits utilized by Defendants." (R. p. 246). Paragraph 2 provides Dr.
Hammerman's opinions,2 and paragraph 4 simply lists information considered, such as medical
records for Mr. Dlouhy, hospital records, depositions, the pleadings in this case, Dr. Schmidt's
report, various Idaho Codes, and Kootenai Health policies. (R. pp. 232-246).
At deposition on March 12, 2019, Dr. Hammerman testified as follows:
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.

Have you been licensed to practice medicine in the State ofldaho?
No.
Have you ever practiced medicine in the state of Idaho?
No.
Have you ever spoken to anybody who has practiced medicine in the state of
Idaho about this case?
No.
Have you talked to anybody in Kootenai County about this case?

2

Paragraph 2 of Dr. Hammerman's expert witness disclosure illogically provides numerous
broad theories of his familiarity with a local standard of care, mixed with reasons he contends
there is no local standard of care. For example, he broadly asserts 1) national licensing exams
and board certifications established a national standard of care, 2) his review of deposition
testimony familiarized him with the relevant community standards of care, and 3) that federal
and local law as well as Kootenai Health policies supplanted any local standard of care in this
case.
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A.

No.

(R. p. 344, Hammerman Depo. p. 7, 11. 3-15)

Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Okay. Do you personally use physician's assistants in your practice?
No.
Okay. When was the last time you had a physician assistant in your practice?
I've not had physician assistants in my office.
So you've never used a physician's assistant?
No.
What about a nurse practitioner?
No.

(R. p. 347; Hammerman Depo. p. 18, 11. 11-20)

Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.

You made reference to looking at some Idaho statutes. How did those help you
form your opinions in this case?
They didn't.
What?
They didn't.
They didn't, okay.

(R. p. 352; Hammerman Depo. p. 39, 11. 8-15).
II.

ISSUE ON APPEAL

In order to assist the Court, Respondents restate the issues on appeal as follows:

A.

Whether the District Court acted within its broad discretion in determining that
the Dlouhys' expert witnesses lacked foundation to testify to the community
standard of care.

B.

Whether the District Court erred in granting summary judgment to Kootenai
Health.
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III.
A.

ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL

Is Respondent entitled to attorney fees on appeal pursuant to I.A.R. 40 and 41 due
to Appellants' failure to identify any misapplication of the law and/or abuse of
discretion by the district court?
IV.

A.

ARGUMENT

The Standard of Review in This Case Should Dictate Affirmance.

Before determining whether there is sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of
material fact to preclude summary judgment, a court must first address the admissibility
of expert testimony. See Dulaney v. St. Alphonsus Reg'! Med. Ctr., 137 Idaho 160, 164, 45 P.3d
816, 820 (2002). The admissibility of expert testimony in medical malpractice action is a
threshold question left to the sound discretion of the district court. Lepper v. E. Idaho Health
Servs., 160 Idaho 104, 108, 369 P.3d 882, 886 (2016); Dulaney, 137 Idaho at 164, 45 P.3d at

820. "A district court's evidentiary rulings will not be disturbed by [an Appellate court] unless
there has been a clear abuse of discretion." Suhadolnik v. Pressman, 151 Idaho 110, 114, 254
P.3d 11, 15 (2011) (quoting McDaniel v. Inland Northwest Renal Care Group-Idaho, LLC, 144
Idaho 219, 221-22, 159 P.3d 856, 858-59 (2007)). A trial court does not abuse its discretion if it:
1) correctly perceives the issue as one of discretion; 2) acts within the outer boundaries of its
discretion; 3) acts consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices
available to it; and, 4) reaches its decision through an exercise of reason. Lunneborg v. My Fun
Life, 163 Idaho 856,867,421 P.3d 187, 198 (2018). This Court has long held that the appellate

court should not substitute its discretion for that of the trial court. "Implicit in this principle is the
truism that the appellate court should not simply focus upon the results of a discretionary
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decision below, but rather upon the process by which the trial court reached its discretionary
decision." Quickv. Crane, 111 Idaho 759,772, 727P.2d 1187, 1200(1986).
Idaho Code§§ 6-1012 and 6-1013 govern the admissibility of expert witness testimony in
medical malpractice cases in conjunction with summary judgment proceedings. Without
satisfying the enumerated preconditions of admissibility contained in these statutes, a medical
expert's opinions cannot be used to establish a prima facie claim for medical negligence under
Idaho Code§ 6-1012. See Dulaney, 137 Idaho at 164, 45 P.3d at 820.
B.

Plaintiffs Pursuing Medical Malpractice Actions Must Comply with the
Requirements of Idaho Code §§ 6-1012 and 6-1013.

The district court properly considered the requirements of Idaho Code §§ 6-1012 and 61013 in its discretionary decision not to admit Appellants' proffered expert testimony in this case.
Irrespective of Appellants' attempted erosion of the clear statutory requirements of Idaho Code
§§ 6-1012 and 6-1013 and references to modem technology and available healthcare resources,
for better or worse, those statutes as enacted by Idaho Legislature are the law of this state.
Despite the long-time resistance to the "locality rule" in medical malpractice cases, this Court has
consistently ruled, "it is the province of the Legislature to make and amend laws," and such laws
must be applied by the court as written. E.g., Hoffer v. Shappard, 160 Idaho 868, 883, 380 P.3d
681, 696 (2016).
I.C. § 6-1012 specifically provides that plaintiffs claiming medical negligence,
"must, as an essential part of his or her case in chief, affirmatively prove by direct
expert testimony. . . [that the defendant] negligently failed to meet the applicable
standard of health care practice of the community in which such care allegedly ...
was provided, as such standard existed at the time and place of the alleged
negligence of such physician and surgeon. . . and as such standard then and there
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existed with respect to the class of health care provider that such defendant than
and there belonged to and in which capacity he, she or it was functioning. Such
individual providers of health care shall be judged in such cases in comparison
with similarly trained and qualified providers of the same class in the same
community, taking into account his or her training, and fields of medical
specialization, if any.
I.C. § 6-1012. "Community" is defined as geographical areas ordinarily served by the licensed
general hospital at or nearest to which such care was or allegedly should have been provided-in
this case, Coeur d'Alene, Kootenai County, Idaho. Id.
As correctly noted by the district court in this case, before a plaintiff can offer expert
testimony to support a prima facie case of medical negligence, the plaintiff must lay proper
foundation as mandated by Idaho Code § 6-1013. As such, a plaintiff must first establish that its
expert witness has "actual knowledge of the applicable said community standard to which
his or her expert opinion testimony is addressed." I.C. § 6-1013 (emphasis added); Dulaney,
137 Idaho at 164, 45 P.3d at 820.
It is the plaintiffs' burden to establish that their expert "is familiar with the local standard

of care for the particular health care professional for the relevant community and time ... [and]
must also state how he or she became familiar with that standard of care." Dulaney, 137 Idaho at
164, 45 P.3d at 820. Plaintiffs' failure to establish familiarity of the local standard of care to
support their experts' opinions is detrimental to their medical negligence claims. See, e.g.,
Arregui v. Gallegos-Main, 153 Idaho 801, 805, 291 P.3d 1000, 1005 (2012) (affirming summary
judgment where plaintiff failed to demonstrate how their expert witnesses became familiar with
the local standard of care).
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Here, the district court correctly interpreted the legal thresholds of admissibility under
these statutes and logically determined, based on the entirety of the evidence before it, that the
Appellants failed to establish that their disclosed experts, Dr. Hammerman and Dr. Schmidt had
actual knowledge of the local community standard of care as required by Idaho Code§§ 6-1012
and 6-1013.
C.

The Court did not Abuse its Discretion to Find That Dr. Hammerman Failed to
Establish he had Sufficient Familiarity with the Local Standard of Care to Testify.

Instead of familiarizing himself with the community standard of care through recognized
means as provided under Idaho law, 3 Dr. Hammerman took a shot-gun style approach, claiming
familiarity with the relevant standard of care through his review of various depositions
transcripts, medical records, written policies, and statutes, while simultaneously claiming the
community standard of care does not exist.
In this case, the district court properly determined that Dr. Hammerman's contentions
were insufficient to establish he had actual knowledge of the community standard of care as it
pertains to each healthcare provider in 2015-2016: Dr. James, a gastroenterologist, PA
McMahon, a gastroenterology physician's assistant, and NP Hildebrandt, a gastroenterology
nurse practitioner.

3

Such as, obtain knowledge of the local standard of care through phone consultation with a local
specialist or review of a deposition in which a local specialist testified to the local standard of
care. See Rhodehouse v. Stutts, 125 Idaho 208,212, 868 P.2d 1224, 1228 (1994).
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1.

Board certification and national testing does, without more, facto establish the
standard of health care practice in Coeur d'Alene, Kootenai County, Idaho.

Idaho law mandates that healthcare providers are to be judged in comparison with
similarly trained and qualified providers in the same community. See I.C. § 6-1012(c); Hall v.
Rocky Mountain Emergency Physicians, LLC, 155 Idaho 322, 329, 312 P.3d 313, 319 (2013).
Contrary to the assertions of Appellants, Idaho law does not recognize that a national standard of
care rather than a local standard of care applies to board-certified specialists or health care
providers subject to national examinations. See Grimes v. Green, 113 Idaho 519, 522, 746 P.2d
879, 981 (1987); Morrison v. St. Luke's Regional Medical Center, Ltd., 160 Idaho 599, 605, 377
P.3d 1062, 1068 (2016); Pearson v. Parsons, 114 Idaho 334, 757 P.2d 197 (1988) (offering of
knowledge of a statewide standard of care was held insufficient); Strode v. Lenzi, 116 Idaho 214,
775 P.2d 106 (1989) (expert not competent where relying on national standard of care).
Instead, to lay proper foundation for admission of an expert's opinion on this topic, Idaho
courts have, at a minimum, uniformly required: (1) the out-of-area expert to consult with a local
specialist who is familiar with the local standard of care and who informs the out-of-area expert
that the local standard has been replaced by the national standard, or (2) the out-of-area expert to
review deposition testimony from a local specialist who, in his or her deposition, testified that
the local standard of care had been replaced by the national standard; Compare Suhadolnik, 151
Idaho at 118-19, 254 P.3d at 19-20, with Perry v. Magic Valley Reg'! Med. Ctr., 134 Idaho 46,
52, 995 P.2d 816, 822 (2000); See also Strode, 116 Idaho at 216, 775 P.2d at 108 (holding that
an expert's statement of familiarity of the local standard of care due to his identical board
certification and familiarity with a national standard as "totally insufficient").
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Appellants' argument, in large part, relies on Samples v. Hanson, 161 Idaho 179, 185, 384
P.3d 943, 949 (2016). This case, along with Buck v. St. Claire, 108 Idaho 743, 746, 702 P.2d
781, 784 (1985), and Mattox v. Life Care Centers of America, Inc., 157 Idaho 468, 337 P.3d 627
(2014 ), were thoroughly briefed by the parties and examined by the district court in this case. (R.
pp. 198-217, 425-442, 734-748, 757-785). Instead of recognizing the clear mandate of Idaho
Code § 6-1012, the Appellants misinterpret the facts and holding in Samples, and argue that the
Idaho Supreme Court established a new rule, diminishing the need for an out-of-state expert of
the same specialty to familiarize themselves with the local standard of care. 4 The district court
correctly interpreted the ruling in Samples and held consistent with the statutory requirement that
medical experts must show actual knowledge of the applicable local standard of care.
In Samples, the Idaho Supreme Court recognized the unique facts of the case in which the
expert in question was actually familiar with the local standard of care at issue, as he replaced
the local provider in the local practiced and had practiced locally in the role in question during
the same time. 161 Idaho at 185; 384 P.3d at 949. The court specifically stated, "this case does
not present a situation where an out-of-area doctor is required to become familiar with the local
standard of care by consulting with a local physician." Id. Although the court engaged in a
discussion regarding board-certified physicians, the Samples holding did not create a new rule
creating a national standard of care for said providers. Id. Instead, the court's holding was narrow
and remained consistent with Idaho Code § 6-1012, and the case precedent such as Grimes. See
4

In an attempt to obscure Dr. Hammerman's clear lack of effort to appropriately familiarize
himself with the local standards of care applicable in this case, Appellants go so far as to point to
unrelated issues, such as the resources available at Kootenai Health and its affiliations, which do
not relate to the local standard of care.
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Grimes, 113 Idaho at 522, 746 P.2d at 981 (1987) (determining that holding board-certified
physicians to a national standard in which the actions of all such physicians will be measured,
would ignore the clear mandate of I.C. § 6-1012). As the district court identified, the Idaho
Supreme Court has disavowed Buck v. St. Claire, 108 Idaho 743, 746, 702 P.2d 781, 784 (1985)
for the very purpose Appellants argue Samples applies in this case. This Court held the language
in Buck that appeared to indicate the national standard of care supplants the local standard of care
for board-certified physicians was dicta, and was not the narrow holding of the case-finding
such language contrary to the mandate of I.C. § 6-1012. Grimes, 113 Idaho at 522, 746 P.2d at
981.
In this case, it is not disputed that Dr. Hammerman and Dr. James share a board
certification in gastroenterology. However, it is also undisputed that Dr. Hammerman has no
experience practicing in Idaho, has not practiced in the relevant medical community, and did not
consult with a local specialist to ensure there was any local deviation in the standard of care.
Thus, this case is clearly distinguishable from the facts of Samples. Dr. Hammerman's expert
disclosure and deposition testimony are devoid of any foundation of his actual knowledge of the
local standard of care in Coeur d'Alene, Idaho at the relevant time. Instead, it skirts around the
issue in an attempt to cloak his lack of effort to become actually familiar with the community
standard of care for a gastroenterologist, physician's assistant, and nurse practitioner applicable
in this case. Without a "clear articulation" of the relevant community of care or actual knowledge
as to the replacement of such with a national standard of care, Dr. Hammerman did not properly
familiarize himself with the relevant standards of care. Dr. Hammerman simply did not articulate
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how the licensing standards of the subject healthcare providers established the community
standard in their respective roles.
2.

The Depositions relied upon by Dr. Hammerman were insufficient to
familiarize him with the local standards of care in this action.

The district court correctly determined that the deposition testimony of Dr. James, Dr.
Bartels, and NP Hildebrandt as referenced by Dr. Hammerman were insufficient for him to
acquire actual knowledge of the standard of care because nowhere in any of these depositions did
anyone actually state the local standard of care applicable to a gastroenterologist, physician's
assistant, or nurse practitioner in Coeur d'Alene, Kootenai County, Idaho between 2015 and
2016. Those questions simply were not asked of the Kootenai Health providers.
For an expert to rely on deposition testimony as a basis for his knowledge of the
applicable standard of care, the deposition "testimony must clearly articulate the local standard
of care for the particular time, place and specialty at issue in order to meet the foundational
requirements of I.C. § 6-1013." Suhadolnik, 151 Idaho at 117-18, 254 P.3d at 18-19 (emphasis
added); Rhodehouse, 125 Idaho at 212, 868 P.2d at 1228 (finding insufficient foundation where
the deposition reviewed never stated that the local standard of care was the same as the national
standard, nor did it make any direct reference to the local standard of care). Testimony which
describes what a single health care provider did or what steps they would take, cannot establish
what the standard of care requires, even if the health care provider resides in that community. See
Suhadolnik, 151 Idaho at 119-20, 254 P.3d at 19-20.
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Dr. Hammerman cited the following portions of deposition testimony as a basis for his
standard of care opinions contending that " ... Dr. James confirmed that the standard of care
required a repeat colonoscopy."
Q. And if you can't see, what do you need to do?
A. Well, the best thing is to- we see him in follow-up and recommend they get another
colonoscopy.
Q. And why would you do that?
A. To get a better prep, get a better look.
Q. You don't think you had a good look on this one?
A. No. And that's what I stated.
(R. p. 236).
Dr. Hammerman also improperly contends, "Dr. James acknowledged that a national standard
of care applies to board-certified physicians" in the following deposition excerpt:
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

And you were board certified in 2014?
Yes.
And '15?
Yes
Q. Is there anything different about the practice of gastroenterology in- with Kootenai or
Coeur d'Alene that is different than the way you practiced when you were doing your
fellowship in San Francisco?
A. I get to wear what I want.
Q. Other than dress.
A. Other than the blue- the blue shirt and blue coat, yeah.
Q. The dress isn't military standard; is that A. Right.
Q. -what you're saying? Okay.
A. Otherwise, no.
(R. p. 235) (quoting Dr. James' Deposition).

Id. Dr. Hammerman further improperly relies on the deposition testimony of NP Hildebrandt
and Dr. Bartels, a board-certified oncologist practicing in Coeur d'Alene, Idaho, respectively as
follows:
Q. Put another way, a patient would have to have all the right information in order to
make the most intelligent decision about their care, right?
A. Sure.
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Q. If there's something significant about a finding or diagnostic study, those are things
that a patient needs to be told in order for them to take your recommendation, correct?
A. Sure.
Q. And it would be beneath the standard of care not to provide that information and
expect a patient to make the decision in that vacuum, correct?
A. Beneath the standard of care?
Q. Yeah.
A. Sure.
(R. p. 241) (quoting NP Hildebrandt's Deposition).
Q. And shifting away from statistics or prognosis or probabilities, I want to focus more
on an underlying, a concerning finding, because you would agree with me that there
might be different treatment options depending on what the finding is.
A. True.
Q. And a patient has a right to make decisions about how to treat a certain disease based
on that finding?
A. Yes.
Q. And in order to do that, the patient needs the complete and accurate information
about the underlying diagnosis to do that?
A. Yes.
Q. And it's the standard of care to give them that information A.Uh-huh.
Q. And that's not dependent on a medical specialty or geographic location, that's just a
basic patient fundamental right.
A. Uh-huh.
Q. Is that true?
(Atty. Hazel for Defendant- Objection as to form)
Q. You would agree that's true?
A. Yes.
(R. p. 242) (quoting Dr. Bartels' Deposition).
Here, the Appellants attempt to analogize Dr. Hammerman's review of deposition
testimony to that of the expert in Garriott v. Western Medical Associates, PLLC, Case No. 2:16CV-00081-CWD, 2017 WL 3288596, at *10 (D. Idaho Aug. 2, 2017). The Appellants quote the
United States District Court's comment, "Upon review of the depositions the Court finds that,
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taken together as a whole, the four depositions provide a complete picture of the standard of care
applicable to the emergency room physicians ... " Id. However, the Appellants fail to discuss
Judge Dale's clear notation that "the experts in this matter reviewed four depositions of each
[treating physician] and spoke with Dr. Johnson" (a local physician of the same specialty), thus
clearly providing proper foundation regardless of the deposition review. Id. (emphasis in
original) (citing Grover v. Smith, 137 Idaho 247, 46 P.3d 1105, 1109 (2002) (explaining either a
phone call with a local specialist or review of a deposition is sufficient)).
Moreover, this matter is factually distinguishable from Garriott. The depositions
reviewed in this case are related to different health care provider roles and standardsgastroenterologist, gastroenterology nurse practitioner, and a gastroenterology physician's
assistant, not one single standard of care. Thus unlike the comment in Garriott, they could not be
taken together as a whole to provide a "complete picture" of distinctly different standards of care
for different classes of health care providers.
The district court properly found that the deposition testimony relied upon by Dr.
Hammerman was insufficient to familiarize him with the relevant standards of care. Dr. Bartles
directly declined to opine on the standard of care of gastroenterology, and at most provided
generalized testimony regarding the need to inform a patient of an "concerning finding." And
NP Hildebrandt stated her opinion as to whether and when a patient has a right to certain
information. 5 None of the deposition excerpts noted by Dr. Hammerman indicate the relevant

5

There is certainly evidence that the Dlouhys were informed of the concerning CT findings on
May 25, and May 26, 2015, by multiple providers, despite Mrs. Dlouhy's deposition testimony to
the contrary. (See R. pp. 484, 489, 495, and 497). Again, the instant issue does not involve a
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time period in question, nor do the "clearly articulate" the applicable standards of care in Coeur
d'Alene, Idaho.
The deposition transcripts reviewed could not provide Dr. Hammerman with
"comparison[ s] with similarly trained and qualified providers of the same class in the same
communit[ies] taking into account his or her training, experience, and the fields of medical
specialization[s]," therefore they were insufficient to provide actual knowledge of the local
standards of care in this case. The district court did not abuse its discretion in logically coming to
this conclusion.
3.

The policies, regulations, and Joint Commission standards, relied upon by Dr.
Hammerman, were insufficient to supplant the local standard of care for the
purposes of Idaho Code§§ 6-1012 and 6-1013.

"An out-of-area expert in a medical malpractice may satisfy the actual knowledge
requirement is [sic] by demonstrating familiarity with a statewide or national standard of care
that has superseded the local standard of care ... [however] not all state or federal regulations are
the type that can replace a local standard of care. Navo v. Bingham Mem'l Hosp., 160 Idaho 363,
371-72, 373 P.3d 681, 689-90 (2016). In order to supplant the local standard of care, the
regulation or policy must be more than "some general regulatory scheme for a given area of
medicine, . . . only regulations that concern the 'physical administration of health services' can
replace a local standard of care for purposes ofldaho Code sections 6-1012 and 6-1013." Id.
(citing Mattox, 157 Idaho at 478).

factual dispute, but the threshold issue of whether Appellants' experts laid an adequate
foundation for their opinions to be admissible.
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Here, much like in Navo, the policies and regulations relied upon fail to provide
"concrete guidance" but instead contain generalities of compliance, safety, and effective
administration, and thus cannot be relied upon. Navo, 160 Idaho at 372, 373 P.3d at 690. For
example,

Dr.

Hammerman references

Kootenai

Health policies,

"Patient Rights

&

Responsibilities," "Hospital Wide Discharge Planning," and federal regulations 42 CFR §
482.13, 482.43(d). Also, notably left out of the Appellants' Brief is the fact that Dr. Hammerman
contends that the Joint Commission standards somehow established the local community
standard of care in this case.

In reality, Dr. Hammerman never bothered to discover that

Kootenai Health is accredited by DNV Health Care, a completely separate accreditation body
from the Joint Commission.

Dr. Hammerman's lack of knowledge that Joint Commission

standards simply do not apply in Kootenai Health's community pointedly demonstrates Dr.
Hammerman's lack of knowledge of the relevant community standard of care.

Indeed, Dr.

Hammerman's erroneous reliance on Joint Commission standards demonstrates ignorance of the
community standard of care, rather than knowledge of it.
Kootenai Health's "Patient Rights Policy" is nearly identical to 42 CFR § 483 .13 and
provides that "As a patient, you are entitled to ... be informed concerning your diagnosis,
treatment, and prognosis as well as the names of those responsible for your care." This language
does not provide concrete guidance to healthcare providers' actions in the administration of
health care practices or a specific standard of care. It does not shed light on how soon a followup colonoscopy should be suggested after one given with fair preparation. Similarly, the
language contained in 42 § CFR 482.43, as well as the various other referenced organizational
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policies of Kootenai Health, do not regulate healthcare. 6 Instead, they provide very general
guidance, not concrete guidelines for medical providers. Dr. Hammerman's attempted reliance on
such regulations and policies to establish a national standard of care takes the policies out of
context and is clearly contrary to Idaho precedent. It would be outside the realm of
reasonableness to conclude that these policies and regulations in any way dictate the
administration of gastroenterology care as performed by Dr. James, NP Hildebrandt, or PA
McMahon in 2015 and 2016.
The distict court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to admit Dr. Hammerman's
opinions at summary judgment.
D.

The District Court did not Abuse its Discretion by Finding that Dr. Schmidt Failed
to Establish she had Actual Knowledge of the Local Standard of Care.
Appellants incorrectly perceived the district court's determination of foundation with

respect to Dr. Schmidt. The Appellants argue that the district court erred in determining that Dr.
Schmidt needed to share the same specialty as Dr. James to opine as to the standard of care in
this case. I.C. § 6-1013(e). That is not what the district court concluded.
Citing Mattox, the district court stated, "it is unnecessary for an expert witness to be of
the same specialty as the defendant so long as the expert establishes he possesses actual
knowledge of the standard of care to be applied." 157 Idaho 468, 475, 337 P.3d 627, 634 (2014)
(quoting Newberry v. Martens, 142 Idaho 284, 292, 127 P.3d 187, 195 (2005)). The district court
went on to properly conclude the Dr. Schmidt's expert disclosure and corresponding February 9,
6

42 CFR 482.43 provides, "The hospital must transfer or refer patients, along with necessary
medical information to appropriate facilities ... as needed, for followup or ancillary care."
(emphasis added).
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2019 report was devoid of the requirements of Idaho Code §§ 6-1012 and 6-1013 because she
failed to specifically articulate the applicable standard of care and failed to state how her review
of the listed documents familiarized her with the community standard of care.
After a detailed recitation of facts, Dr. Schmidt opines in list form opinions of "breaches
of the standard of care" for Kootenai Health employees, Dr. James, PA McMahon, and NP
Hildebrandt. At no time did Dr. Schmidt state her basis of knowledge of the local standard of
care. It is unclear what foundation, if any, Dr. Schmidt is relying upon to provide her the
required actual knowledge of the community standard of care to offer testimony in this case. 7 Dr.
Schmidt's February 9, 2019 report and curriculum vitae do not show that she has acquired "actual
knowledge" of the applicable standard of health care practice for gastroenterology care in Coeur
d'Alene, Idaho as it existed in 2015 and 2016. She provided no basis for actual knowledge of the
standard of care for a gastroenterology physician, gastroenterology physician's assistant, or a
gastroenterology nurse practitioner, which are all separate classes of health care. Moreover, she
has never practiced in Kootenai County, Idaho, or gastroenterology in any state.
Dr. Schmidt "cannot become familiar with the local standard of care merely by reviewing
hospital records and the actions of a local physician." Rhodehouse, 125 Idaho at 212, 868 P.2d at
1228. She must possess actual knowledge of the applicable community standards to which her
expert opinion testimony is addressed. Samples, 161 Idaho at 183; 384 P.3d at 947. Dr. Schmidt

7

Dr. Schmidt wholly relies on a single generalized statement that she reviewed what Plaintiffs
counsel provided her. She does not once state what information provided her sufficient
foundational knowledge to testify on the local standard of care for gastroenterology providers.
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simply failed to produce any basis for her actual knowledge of the community or local standard
of care, rendering her opinions inadmissible.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in striking Dr. Schmidt's opinions.
E.

Summary Judgment was Appropriately Granted Because Appellants did not
Comply with the Foundational Requirements of Idaho Code§§ 6-1012 and 6-1013.

"To avoid summary judgment in a medical malpractice case, the plaintiff must offer
expert testimony indicating that the defendant health provider negligently failed to meet the
applicable standard of health care practice." Dulaney, 137 Idaho at 164, 45 P.3d at 820. Thus,
where a plaintiff fails to establish adequate foundation for the opinions of their medical experts
pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 6-1012 and 6-1013, a plaintiff cannot, as a matter of law, establish a
prima facie case of medical malpractice.
The district court correctly perceived the admissibility of Dr. Hammerman and Dr.
Schmidt's testimony as matters of discretion, and acted within the boundaries of its discretion
through the correct legal standard, in determining a lack of foundation under Idaho Code §§ 61012 and 6-1013. Therefore, in accordance with I.R.C.P. 56, even drawing all reasonable
inferences in favor of Appellants, the district court properly granted summary judgment as a
matter of law. The Court should heed Justice Horton's dissent in Samples v. Hanson, 161 Idaho
179, 384 P.3d 943 (2016), when he cautioned against usurping "the discretionary powers of the
trial court." Id. at 186, 384 P.3d at 950. "When determining the admissibility of an expert's
opinion, the focus of the trial court's inquiry is on the principles and methodology used and not
the conclusions they generate." J-U-B Engineers, Inc. v. Security Ins. Co. of Hariford, 146 Idaho
311, 315, 193 P.3d 858, 862 (2008). This Court should not review the facts considered by the
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trial court and come to a different conclusion. This Court should apply the abuse of discretion
standard and defer to the trial court's "broad discretion" in determining the admissibility of
evidence. Id. In short, this Court should not substitute its discretion for that of the district court
and affirm its decision.
F.

Attorney Fees on Appeal are Appropriate.
A party prevailing on an appeal in a civil action may request this Court to grant an award

of attorney fees and costs. See I.C. § 12-121 and I.A.R. 40 and 41(a). "Where an appeal turns on
the question of law, an award of attorney fees is proper if the law is well settled and the appellant
has made no substantial showing that the district court misapplied the law." Wait v. Leavell
Cattle, Inc., 136 Idaho 729, 799, 41 P.3d 220, 227 (2001) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
Respondents believe that this case was appealed without an adequate foundation.
The case law on the requirements to qualify an expert to testify about the local standard
of care for a particular class of healthcare providers for the relevant time is well established.
Idaho Code §§ 6-1012 and 1013 and Idaho case law clearly set out the requirements for laying
the foundation for expert opinion testimony. As found by the district court, the Appellants failed
to meet the mandated foundation requirements. Rather than analyze the district court's process
for exercising its discretion not to admit the Appellants' expert testimony, Appellants simply
invite this Court to review the facts and exercise its discretion to reach a different conclusion.
V.

CONCLUSION

As demonstrated above, the district court acted within its broad and sound discretion in
determining Dr. Hammerman and Dr. Schmidt's expert opinions were without proper foundation
as required by Idaho Codes §§ 6-1012 and 6-1013 and properly granted summary judgment in
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this case. Therefore, the judgment of the district court should be affirmed, and Respondents
should be awarded attorney's fees and costs on appeal.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 14th day of January 2020.
WITHERSPOON • KELLEY

Isl Joel P. Hazel
Joel P. Hazel, ISB No. 4980
Nathan J. Orlando, ISB No. 10674
Attorneys for Respondents
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